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Abstract 
  
Audit is an essential element in the safety management systems operated by high risk industries and is legally 
mandated in many regimes which regulate major accident hazards. Widespread doubt has been expressed as 
to audit effectiveness and this paper explores the current debate and the response by several operators 
towards the audit challenge. 
  
Introduction 
A safety audit according to European Process Safety Centre1 (EPSC) is 
  
‘A process of independent, systematic examination to assess the extent of conformance with defined standards 
and recognised good practice, to thereby identify opportunities for improvement.’ 
 
It is the aim of this paper to explore this description from the perspective of the internal auditing performed by 
a major hazards operator or in other words the process safety management (PSM) system owner. 
  
Audit failings in major accidents 
  
Investigations into major accidents in recent years have revealed flaws in PSM systems and more specifically 
shortcomings in the audit process itself which is designed to maintain and improve the system. In the aftermath 
of Texas City the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel2 (known informally as the Baker Panel) 
expressed its concern that: 
  
‘The principal focus of audits was with compliance and verifying that required management systems were in 
place to satisfy legal requirements.  It does not appear, however, that BP used the audits to ensure that the 
management systems were delivering the desired safety performance or to assess a site’s performance against 
industry best practices.’ 
 
In one of its ten key recommendations the Baker Panel made explicit reference to process safety auditing and 
proposed that BP should establish and implement an effective system to audit process safety performance at its 
US refineries. 
  
Published criticism of safety auditing 
  
The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission3 whilst recognising several benefits of safety audit 
tools observed that they can act as a barrier to the effectiveness of a SMS.  The Commission listed several 
shortcomings with audit tools which include their “one size fits all” approach and their inability to assess the 
elements which are pre-conditions for an effective SMS such as senior management commitment and employee 
involvement in the planning, implementation and review of a SMS. 
   
The theme of audit frailty is further developed by Blewett and O’Keefe4 who identified several weaknesses 
related to the auditing of SMS which include paperwork for its own sake (so called tick box auditing), inherent 
problems associated with scoring an audit and lack of auditor independence and competence. 
  
EPSC member auditing practices 
  
Across Europe the system of safety auditing is well established in the high hazards industries but prompted by 
the changing nature of process safety auditing, EPSC convened a working group in 2009 to consider its earlier 
report on SHE auditing practice for the process industries and published the revised report in 2012. An outcome 
of the working group was a survey of member practices with respect to process safety auditing. The respondents 
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without exception were large multinational organisations. Bigelow and Robson5 identified two key factors which 
could affect the reliability and validity of safety audits which are: 
  
1. Auditor-related factors include issues of competence, bias and independence of the individuals carrying 
out the audit. 
2. Process-related factors include the theoretical basis for the audit; the existence of a coherent and 
comprehensive audit framework; the existence of clear standards for comparison; the use of multiple 
information sources; the choice of who to speak to and where to look when auditing a workplace; the 
weighting of various audit components; quality control issues; and details about procedures and 
objectivity. 
  
Findings 
  
EPSC members share the view that the bedrock of auditing is in fact ongoing self assessment from the audited 
facility and unless this occurs it is unlikely that the act of auditing independent to the site will achieve much 
value in the long term. There are encouraging signs that high hazard operators are changing up and improving 
their auditing operations in for instance unannounced or short notice audits, use of specific means of gathering 
audit evidence and benchmarking auditing processes with peer companies. New requirements and new sites 
(especially those that are acquired) present challenges as to how they are treated and integrated into a 
corporate audit programme. The most problematic areas for safety auditing remain the timely and effective 
follow up and close out of audit actions. Audits can add significant value in identifying operations which are too 
inwardly focused (not invented here syndrome), normalise deviant practice (for example temporary modes of 
operation which become permanent) and compliance only mentality. 
  
Conclusions 
 
Several commentators within the process safety community, Eames6 and Sepeda7 continue to see a role for audit 
albeit re-purposed or else as a complement to other assessment tools. This is in contrast to several observers 
outside of the process safety community that see deep rooted problems with auditing often related to 
inadequate PSM system implementation. Although there are few signs that audit based assurance is about to 
be reformed or replaced soon by more searching and reliable tools there is evidence on the ground that major 
hazard operators are trying out improvements to their auditing processes to increase effectiveness. 
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